Entick v Carrington is one of the canons of English public law and in 2015 it is 250 years old. In 1762 the Earl of Halifax, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, despatched Nathan Carrington and three other of the King's messengers to John Entick's house in Stepney. They broke into his house, seizing his papers and causing significant damage. Why? Because he was said to have written seditious papers published in the Monitor. Entick sued Carrington and the other messengers for trespass. The defendants argued that the Earl of Halifax had given them legal authority to act as they had. Lord Camden ruled firmly in Entick's favour, holding that the warrant of a Secretary of State could not render lawful actions such as these which were otherwise unlawful. The case is a canonical statement of the common law's commitment to the constitutional principle of the rule of law. In this collection, leading public lawyers reflect on the history of the case, the enduring importance of the legal principles for which it stands, and the broader implications of Entick v Carrington 250 years on. Winner of the American Society for Legal History Sutherland Prize 2016.

Entick v Carrington is one of the canons of English public law and in 2015 it is 250 years old. In 1762 the Earl of Halifax, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, despatched Nathan Carrington and three other of the King's messengers to John Entick's house in Stepney. They broke into his house, seizing his papers and causing significant damage. Why? Because he was said to have written seditious papers published in the Monitor. Entick sued Carrington and the other messengers for trespass. The defendants argued that the Earl of Halifax had given them legal authority to act as they had. Lord Camden ruled firmly in Entick's favour, holding that the warrant of a Secretary of State could not render lawful actions such as these which were otherwise unlawful. The case is a canonical statement of the common law's commitment to the constitutional principle of the rule of law. In this collection, leading public lawyers reflect on the history of the case, the enduring importance of the legal principles for which it stands, and the broader implications of Entick v Carrington 250 years on. Winner of the American Society for Legal History Sutherland Prize 2016.

Reacting to the mixed record of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 and similar enactments concerned with the protection of human rights, this book explores ways of promoting human rights more effectively through political and democratic mechanisms. The book expresses ideological skepticism concerning the relative neglect of social and economic rights and institutional skepticism concerning the limitations of court-centered means for enhancing human rights goals in general. The contributors criticize the 'juridification' of human rights through transferring the prime responsibility for identifying human rights violations to courts and advocate the greater 'politicization' of human rights responsibilities through such measures as enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of existing and proposed legislation. This group of twenty-four leading human rights scholars from around the world present a variety of perspectives on the disappointing human rights outcomes of recent institutional developments and consider the prospects of reviving the moral force and political implications of human rights values.
Thus, contributors recount the failures of the Human Rights Act with regard to counter-terrorism; chart how the 'dialogue' model reduces parliaments' capacities to hold governments to account for human rights violations; consider which institutions best protect fundamental rights; and reflect on how the idea of human rights could be 'rescued' in Britain today. In addition, the book considers the historical human rights failures of courts during the Cold War and in Northern Ireland, the diverse outcomes of human rights judicial review, and aspects of the human rights regimes in a variety of jurisdictions, including Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, Scotland, Canada, Europe, and the United States.

This new book by Adam Tomkins sets out a radical vision of the British constitution. It argues that despite its outwardly monarchic form the constitution is profoundly informed, and indeed shaped, by values and practices of republicanism. The republican reading of the constitution presented in this book places political accountability at the core of the constitutional order. As such, Our Republican Constitution offers a powerful rejoinder to the current trend in legal scholarship that sees the common law and the courts, rather than Parliament, as the central players in holding government to account. The book further contends that while the constitution should be understood as having republican foundations, current constitutional practice is, in a number of respects, insufficiently republican in character. The book closes by outlining a programme of republican constitutional reform that is designed to secure genuinely responsible government. This is an original and provocative reinterpretation of the central themes of the British constitution, drawing on constitutional history (especially of the seventeenth century), political theory and public law.

This collection of twenty essays, written by an array of internationally prestigious scholars, is a ground-breaking work which raises serious and profound concerns about the entrenchment of human rights generally and into UK law in particular. This is the only book on the market to take a sceptical approach to recent developments in human rights law. Written throughout in an engaging and accessible style, this book is essential reading for all those with an interest in law or politics.

For most of the past two hundred years or more - the grand era of national constitution-making - founding fathers and constitutional scholars alike seem to have focused more sharply on questions of legislative power than they have on executive power. Executive power, by contrast, they worried much less about and sought to delimit less thoroughly. The scope of executive power and its accountability are however endemic problems, which arise within federal and non-federal states. Nor are these issues unique to common law constitutional orders. Problems concerning the nature and delimitation of executive power also arise in civil law jurisdictions and in the European Union. Despite the historical constitutional focus on legislative power, it is executive authority which seems in the early 21st-century to be the more threatening. This book addresses two sets of questions that are under-researched in constitutional scholarship. What is the proper scope of executive authority, how is executive power delimited, and how should it be defined? How is executive authority best held to account, politically and legally? These questions are both descriptive and normative and they are addressed accordingly in each of the chapters by leading public lawyers from a variety of jurisdictions. The book examines executive power in the United Kingdom from a British and from a distinctively Scottish perspective. There are chapters on the four common law jurisdictions of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States; on the four civil law jurisdictions of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain; and on the European Union. This insightful comparative perspective allows themes to be drawn together, and lessons extracted on the nature of executive power and its accountability.

This collection of twenty essays, written by an array of internationally prestigious scholars, is a ground-breaking work which raises serious and profound concerns about the entrenchment of human rights generally and into UK law in particular. This is the only book on the market to take a sceptical approach to recent developments in human rights law. Written throughout in an engaging and accessible style, this book is essential reading for all those with an interest in law or politics.